
Qass TK S^ fe 



Book 



877 



[from the congressional record.] 

COUNTING THE ELECTORAL VOTE. 



SPEECH 



OF 5*$^' 



HON. JAS. A. GARFIELD, 



OIF OHIO, 

DELIVERED 



IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
Thursday, January 25, 1877. 



" A people who can understand and act upon the counsels which God has given it, the 
past events of its history, is safe in the most dangerous crisis of its fate." — Guizot. ^ 



^;^yopcb}v-^< 



I - 

WASHINGTON: \\c 

fi. p. J^OLKINHORN, J^RINTER. Nxi^VyASH\t^^ 

1877. 



1277 



en* at ffrof>e;w s>^'»',^?■ 



SPEECH. 



The House having under consideration the l^ill (S. No. 1153) to provide for and regulate the 
counting of votes for President and Vice-President, and the decision of questions arising 
thereon, for the term commencing March 4, A, D. 1877— 

Mr. GARFIELD said: 

Mr. Speaker : Nothing but the gravity of this subject would induce me to make a 
speech in my present condition of voice. But 1 must attempt it, and trust tha>t the 
kindness of the House will enable me to be heard. 

I desire in the outset to recognize whatever of good there is in this bill. It has some 
great merits which I cheerfnlly recognize. It is intended to avoid strife in a great and 
trying crisis of the nation. It is intended to aid in tiding over a great present difficulty, 
possibly a great public danger. It will doubtless bring out a result. And when it has 
brought out a result, it will leave the person who is declared to be the elect of the na- 
tion with a clearer title, or rather with a more nearly undisputed title, than any new 
method that has yet been suggested. 

These are certainly great resulls. At a tim.e like this, no man should treat lightly a 
bill which may, and probably will produce them all. Furthermore, I feel bound to say, 
if I were to speak of this biil only as a partisan — a word much abused just now — I 
should say that I am not afraid of its operation. The eminent gentlemen who are to 
compose the commission, eminent for their character and abilities, will, I have no 
doubt, seek to do, and will do justice under its provisions. And therefore, believing as 
I do that Rutherford B. Hayes has been honestly and legally elected President of the 
United States, I confidently expect that this comTnission will find that to be the fact, 
and will declare it. Should they find otherwise, all good men everywhere will submit 
to their decision. 

But neither the wishes nor the fate of Mr. Hayes or Mr. Tilden should be consulted 
in considering this bill. I presume no one here is authorized to speak lor either of 
these gentlemen on the question. I certainly am not. It is our business to speak for 
ourselves and for the people whom we represent. 

Before considering the bill itself, I pause to notice one of the reasons that have been 
urged in its favor. 

We have been told to-day in this Chamber, that there is danger of civil war if the 
bill does not pass. I was amazed at the folly which could use such a suggestion as an 
argument in favor of this or any measure. 

The senate at Rome never deliberated a moment after the flag was hauled down 
which floated on the Janiculum Hill, across the Tiber. That flag was the sign that no 
enemy of Rome, breathing hot threats of war, had entered the sacred precincts of the 
city ; and when it was struck, the senate sat no longer. The reply to war is not words, 
but swords. 

When you tell me that civil war is threatened by any party or State in this Republic, 
you have given me a supreme reason why an American Congress should refuse, with 
unutterable scorn, to listen to those who threaten, or do any act whatever under the 
coercion of threats by any power on the earth. With all my soul, I despise your threat 
of civil war, come it from what quarter or what party it may. Brave men, certainly a 
brave nation, will do nothing under such compulsion. We are intrusted witli the work 
of obeying and defending the Constitution. I will not be deterred from obeying it, be- 
cause somebody threatens to destroy it. I dismiss all that class of motives as unworthy 
of Americans. 

On this occasion, as on all others, let us seek only that which is worthy of ourselves 
and of our great country. 

Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control — 
These three alone lead life to sovereign power. 
Yet not for power, (power of herself 
Would come uncalled for,) but to live hy law. 
Acting the law we live by without fear ; 
And, hecause right is right, to follow right. 
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence. 



Let such wisdom and such scorn inspire the House in its consideration of the pend- 
ing measure. 

What, then, are the grounds on which we should consider a bill like this? It would 
be unbecoming in me or in any member of this Congress to oppose this bill on mere 
technical or trifling grounds, It should be opposed, if at all, for reasons so broad, so 
M'eighty as to overcome all that has been said in its favor, and all the advantages which 
I have here admitted may follow from its passage. I do not wish to diminish the stat- 
ure of my antagonist; I do not wish to undei value the points of strength in a measure 
before 1 question its propriety. It is not enough that this bill will tide us over a pres- 
ent danger, however great. Let us for a moment forget Hayes and Tilden, republicans 
and democrats : let us forget our own epoch and our own generation : and, entering a 
broader field, inquire how this thing which we are about to do will affect the great future 
of our Republic ; and in what condition, if we pass this bill, we shall transmit onr in- 
stitutions to those who shall come after ns. The present good which we shall 
achieve by it may be very great ; yet if the evils that will flow from it in the future must 
be greater, it would be base in ns to flinch from trouble by entailing remediless evils 
upon our children. 

In my view, then, the foremost question is this: What will be the effect of this meas- 
ure upon our institutions? I cannot make that inquiry intelligibly, without a brief ref- 
erence to the history of the Constitution, and to some of the formidable questions which 
presented themselves to our fathers nearly a hundred years ago, when they set up this 
goodly frame of government. 

Among the foremost difficulties, both in point of time and magnitude, was how to 
create an executive head of the nation. Our fathers encountered that difficulty the 
first morning after they organized and elected the officers of the constitutional con- 
vention. The first resolution introduced by Randolph of Virginia, on the 29ih day of 
May, recognized that great question, and invited the convention to its examination. 
The men who made the Constitution were deeply read in the profoundest political 
I philosophy of their day. They had learned from Montesquieu, from Locke, from 
Fenelon, and other great teachers of the human race, that liberty is impossible without 
u clear and distinct separation of the three great powers of government. A generation 
before their epoch, Montesquieu had said; 

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or in the same 
body of magistrates there can t>e no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
* * * * * * * 

Thare would be an end of everything were the same man or the same body, whether of the 
nobles or of the people, to exercise these three powers, that of enacting the laws, that of 
executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. 

This was a fundamental truth in the American mind, as it had long been cherished 
and practiced in the British Empire. 

There, as in all monarchies, the creation of a chief executive was easily regu- 
lated by adopting a dynasty, and following the law of primogeniture. 

But our fathers had drawn the deeper lesson of liberty from the inspirations of this 
free new world, that their Chief Executive should be born, not of a dynasty, but of the 
will of a free people regulated by law. 

In the course of their deliberations upon the subject, there were suggested seven 
different plans, which may be grouped under two principal heads or classes. One 
group comprised all the plans for creating the Chief Executive by means of some one 
of the pre existing political organizations of the country. First and foremost was the 
proposition to authorize one or both Houses of the National Legislature to elect the Chief 
Executive. Another was to confer that power upon the governors of the States or 
upon the Legislatures of the States. Another, that he should be chosen directly by 
the people themselves under the laws of the States. The second group comprised all 
the various plans for erf ating a new and separate instrumentality for making the choice. 

At fir.^t, the proposition that the Executive should be elected by the National Legis- 
lature was received by the convention with almost unai iinous approval ; and for the 
reason that up to that t'me, Congress had done all that was done in the way of Nation- 
al Government. It had cieated the nation, had led its fortunes through a thousand 
perils, liad declared and achieved independence, and had preserved the, liberty of the 
people in the midst of a great war. ThbuglT Congress had failed to secure a firm and 



stable Government after the war, yet its glory was not forgotten. As Congress had 
created the Union, it was most natural that our fathers should say Congress shall also 
create the Chief Executive of the nation. And within two weeks after the convention 
assembled, they voted for that plan with absolute unanimity. 

But with equal unanimity they agreed that this plan would be fatal to the stability of 
the Government they were about to establish, if they did not couple with it so me pro- 
vision that should make the President functions of independent of the power that created 
him. To effect this, they provided that the President should be ineligible for re-elec- 
tion. They said it would never do to create a Chief Executive by the voice of the 
National Legislature, and then allow him to be re-elected by that same voice : for he 
would thus become their creature. 

And so, from the first day of their session in May, to within five days of its close in 
September, they grappled with the mighty question. I have many times, and recently 
very carefully, gone through all the records that are left to us of that great transac- 
tion. I find that more than one-seventh of all the pages of the Madison Papers are 
devoted to this Sampson of questions, how the Executive should be chosen and made 
independent of the organization that made the choice. This topic alone occupied more 
than one-seventh of all the time of the convention. 

After a long and earnest debate, after numerous votes nnd reconsiderations, they 
were obliged utterly to abandon the plan of creating the Chief Executive by means of 
the National Legislature. I will not stop now to prove the statement by a dozen or 
pungent quotations from the masters of political science in that great assembly, in- 
which they declared that it would be ruinous to the liberty of the people a^id to the per- 
manence of the Republic if they did not absolutely exclude the National Legislature 
rom any share in the election of the President. 

They pointed with glowing eloquence to the sad but instructive fate of those brilliant 
Italian republics that were destroyed because there .was no adequate separation of 
powers, and because their senates overwhelmed and swallowed np the executive power, 
and, as secret and despotic conclaves, became the destroyers of Italian liberty. 

At the close of the great discussion, when the last vote on this subject was taken by 
our fathers, they were almost unanimous in-excluding the National Legislature from 
any share whatever in the choice of the Chief Executive of the nation. They rejected 
all the plans of the first group, and created a new instrumentality. They adopted the 
system of electors. When that plan was under discussion, they used the utmost pre- 
caution to hedge it about by every conceivable protection against the interference or 
control of Congress. 

In the first place, they said the States shall create the electoral colleges- They al- 
lowed Congress to have nothing whatever to do with the creation of the colleges, except 
merely to fix the time when the States should appoint them. And in order to exclude 
Congress by positive prohibition, in the last days of the convention, they provided that 
no member of either House of Congress should be appointed an elector; so that not 
even by the personal influence of any one of its members could the Congress interfere 
with the election of a President. 

The creation of a President under our Constitution, consists of three distinct steps 
First, the creation of the electoral colleges: second, the vote of colleges; and third, the 
opening and counting of their votes. This is the simple plan of the Constitution. 

The creation of the colleges is left absolutely to the States, within the five limitations 
I had the honor to mention to the House a few days ago; first, it must be a Siate 
that appoints electors ; second, the State is limited as to the number of electors they may 
appoint; third, electors shall not be members of Congress, nor officers of the 
United States ; fourth, the time for appointing electors may be fixed by Congress; 
and fifth, the time when their appointment is announced, which must be before the 
date for giving their votes, may also be fixed by Congress. 

These five simple limitations, and these alone, were laid upon the States. Every 
other act, fact, and thing possible to be done in creating the electoral colleges, was 
absolutely and uncontrollably in the power of the States themselves. Within these 
limitations. Congress has no more power to touch them iu this work than England or 
France. That is the first step. 

The second is still plainer and simpler, namely, the work of the colleges. They 
were created as an independent and separate power, or set of powers, for the sole pur- 
pose of electing a President. They were created by the States. Congress has just one 
thing to do with them, and only one,- it may fix the day when they shall meet. By the 



aat-of 179^ Cotr^ess feed the day as it still stands in the law; and there the authority 
of the Congress over the colleges ended. 

Tliere ^vas a later act; of 1845, which gave to the States the authority to provide bj 
law for lining vacancies of electors in these colleges ; and Conjiress has passed no other 
law on the' subject. 

The States having created them, the time of their assemblage having been fixed by 
Congress, and their power to fill vacancies having been regulated hy State laws, the 
colleges areas independent in the exercise of their functions as is any department of the 
O'Overnmeiit within its sphere. Being thus equipped, their powers are restrained by 
afew simple Hmitalions laid upon them by the Constitution itself: first, they must vote 
for a native born citizen : second, for a man who has been fourteen years a resident of 
the United States : third, at least one of the persons for whom they vote must not be a 
cifiz&n of their own State: ftSiirth, the mode of voting and certifying their returns is 
prc^scribed by the Gbnsiitution itself. Within these simple and plain limitations the 
elieetoral colleges are absolutely independent of the States and of Congress. 

'^'One fact in the history of the constitutional convention, which I have not seen no- 
ticed in any of the recent debates, illustrates very dearly how careful our fathers were 
t6, preserve these colleges. frpm the interference of Congress, and to protect their inde- 
pendence by the bulwarks of the Constitution itself. In the draught of the electoral 
system reported September 4, 1787, it was provided that Congress "may determine the 
time of choosing ap.ii assembling of the electors and the manner of ceriifying and 
trCChs'rkitting ilieir xoles.^'' ... 

J^That was the language of the original draught ; btit our fathers had determined that 
the National Legislature should have nothing to do with the action of the colleges ; and 
the words that gave Congress the power to prescribe the manner of certifying and trans- 
mitting their vates were stricken out. The instrument itself prescribed the mode. 
Thus Congress was wholly expelled from the colleges. The Constitution swept the 
ground clear of all intruders ; and placed its own imperial guardianship around the 
irfdgpendehee of the electoral colleges, by forbidding even Congress to enter the sacred 
circle. No Congressman could enter ; and, except to fix the day of their meeting, 
Congress could. not speak to the electors. 

j These colleges are none the less sovereign and independent, because they exist only 
fot a'd.j^y. They jmeeton.thie same day in all the States ; they do their work summa- 
rily, in one day, and dissolve forever. There is no power to interfere, no power to 
recall them, no power to revise their action. Their work is done ; the record is made 
u^, si^tied, sealed, arid transmitted ; and thus the second great act in the presidential 
election is- eom))leted. I ought to correct myself: the second act ?s the presidential 
e?e0ti.(>n. The election is finished, the hour when the electoral colleges have cast their 
votes and sealed up the record. 

'Still there is a third step in the process; and it is shorter, plainer, simpler than the 
other two. These sealed certificates of the electoral colleges are forwarded to the 
President of- the Seii'ate, where they rest under the silence of the seals for more than 
two months. The' Constitution assumes that the result of the election is still unknown. 
Biifevronaday fixed by law,, and the only day, of all the days of February, on which the 
law commands Congress to be in session, the last act in the plan of electing a Presi- 
depft is to be performed.. •. .. 

fjlow plain.. and simple are- the words that describe this third and last step! Here 
they^^are :.. ' - ■ .v: ■'": - ■'■■■; 

The President of the Senate shall, in the presefce of the Serih,te and House of ReiJreserita- 
tiyes^^ .opea. all the. .ceytiflcates,,? and the^ votes, ghall then be counted, . ■ , - - - 

.Here is no ambiguity. Two "words dominate and inspire the claufie: They '^re the; 
w,brds 02?en and coww^. These words are not shrouded in.theblack-letter mysteries of; 
the. law. They are plain words, understood by every man who speaks our mother', 
tqngu,e, and need no. lexicon or commentary. ': . 

• Consider the grand and simple ceremonial by which the third act is to be completed.- 
On the day fix^d by law, the two Houses of Congress are assembled. The President of 
the Senate, who, by the Constitution, has been made the custodian of the sealed cer- 
tificates from all the electoral colleges, takes his place. The Constitution requires a 
'i<I>§r8ftp 'i^aiid a. '.'.presence.!'. .TliatJLperson "is the President of the Senata;-^nd 
tBatt-*-^ presence " tg t,he-** presgnde'^^'df tjie iv^^dHb'usea. Then two things a^^^^^^ 



done. The certificates are to be opened, and the votes are to be counted. These ar e ^ 
not legislative acts, but clearly and plainly executive acts, I challenge any man to 
find anywhere an accepted definition of an executive act that does not include both 
these. They cannot be tortured into a meaning that will carry them beyond the boun- 
daries of executive action. And one of these acts the President of the Senate is per- 
emptorily ordered to perform. The Constitution commands him to '* open all the cer- 
tificates." Certificates of what? Certificates of the votes of the electoral colleges. 
Not any certificates that anybody may choose to send, but certificates of electors ap- 
pointed by the States. The President of the Senate is presumed to know what are the 
States in the Union ; who are their oflScers ; and when he opens the certificates, he 
learns from the official record who have been appointed electors, and he finds their . 
votes. 

The Constitution contemplated the President of the Senate as the Vice-President of 
the United States, the elect of all the people. And to him is confided the great trust, 
the custodianship of the only official record of the election of President, What is it 
to '' open the certificates?" It would be a narrow and inadequate view of that word 
to .say that it means only the breaking of the seals. To open an envelope is not to 
**open the certificates." The certificate is not the paper on which the record is 
made; it is the record itself. To open the certificate is not a physical, but an intel- 
lectual act. It is to make patent the record ; to publish it. When that is done the 
election of President and Vice-President is published. But one thing remains to bfi 
done ; and here the language of the Constitution changes from the active to the pas- 
sive voice, from the personal to the impersonal. To the trusted custodian of the votes, 
succeeds the impersonality of arithmetic ; the votes have been made known ; there 
remains only the command of the Constitution: "They shall be counted," that is, the 
numbers shall be added up. 

No further act is required. The Constitution itself declares the result. 

The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall he President, if such 
number he a majority of the whole number of electors appointed. 

If no person has such majority, the House of Representatives shall immediately 
choose a President; not the House as organized for legislation; but a new electoral 
college is created out of the members of the House, by means of which each State has 
one vote for President, and only one. 

To review the ground over which 1 have traveled: The several acts that constitute the 
election of a President may be symbolized by a pyramid consisting of three massive, 
separate blocks. The first, the creation of the electoral college by the States, is the 
broad base. It embraces the legislative, the judicial, and the executive powers of the 
States. All the departnients of the State government and all the voters of the State 
co-operate in shaping and perfecting it. 

The action of the electoral colleges forms the second block, perfect in jtself, and 
independent of the others, superimposed with exactness upon the first. 

The opening and counting of the votes of the colleges is the little block that crowns 
and completes the pyramid. 

Such, Mr. Speaker, was the grand and simple plan by which the framers of the Con- 
stitution empowered all the people, acting under the laws of the several States, to 
create special and select colleges of independent electors to choose a President, who 
should be, not the creature of Congress, nor of the States, but the Chief Magistrate of 
the whole nation, the elect of all the people. 

When the Constitution was completed and sent to the people of the States for 
ratification, it was subjected to the severest criticism of the ablest men of that genera- 
tion. Those sections which related to the election of President not only escaped cen- 
sure, but received the highest commendation. The sixty-seventh number of the Fede- 
ralist, written by Alexander Hamilton, was devoted to this feature of the instrument. 
That great writer congratulated the country that the convention had devised a method 
that made the President free from all pre-existing bodies, that protected the process of 
election from all interference by Congress and from the cabals and intrigues so likely 
to arise in legislative bodies.* 

^Ti^e^p.de of appointment of the Chief Magistrate oi the United States is almost the -only 
part of the system of any consequence which has escaped without severe censure or whiQb 
has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents, .Tiie most j,)lauaible of 



8 

these, ^Tio has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President 
isf pretty well guarded. I venture some-what further and hesitate not to affirm that. if the 
manner of it he not perfect, it is at least excellent- It unites in an eminent degree all the ad- 
vantages the union of which was to he wished for. It was desirable that the sense of the peo- 
ple should operate in the choice of the i)erson to whom so important a trust was to he confi- 
ded. This end will he auswexed hy committing the right of making it not to any pre-estah- 
lished hody, hut to men chosen hy the people for the special purpose and at the particular 
juncture. * * * They have not made the appointment of the Pi'esident to depend on any 
pre-existing hodies of men who might he tampered with heforehand to prostitute 
their votes ; hut they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people 
of America, to be exerted in the choice of per^sons for the temporary and sole purpose of 
maliing the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust all those who 
from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the Preident in office. * * * 

Another and no less important desideratum was that the Executive should be indepedent 
for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise he 
tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to du- 
ration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secui^ed by making his re-elec- 
tion to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single 
purpose of making the important choice. —-From the sixty-seventh number of the Federalist. 

The earliest commentator upon the Constitution, St. George Tucker, of Virginia, 
writing at the begiuuing of the present century, made this clause of the Constitution 
the subject of special eulogy, and pointed to the fact that all the proceedings in rela- 
tion to the election of a President were to be brief, summary, and decisive ; that the 
right of the President to his office depends upon no one but the people themselves, and 
that the certificates of his election were to be publicly opened "and counted in the 
presence of the whole National Legislature." f 

The electors, we perceive, are to assemble on one and the same day, in all the different 
Btates, at as niauyaiffereut places, at a very considerable distance from each other, and on 
that day are simply to give their votes ; they then disperse and return to their respective hab- 
itations and occupations immediately. No pretext can be had for delay ; no opportunity is fur- 
nished for intrigue and cabal. The certificates of their votes * * * are to be publicly opened 
and counted in the i>resence of the whole National Legislature. * * * There is no room for the 
ta.rbuieuce of a Campus JIartius or a Polish diet, on the one hand, nor for the intrigues of the 
sacred college or a Venetian senate on the other ; unless when it uniorlunately happens that 
two persons, having a majtirity of the whole, number of electors in their favor, have likewise 
an egual number of votes, or where by an.v other means the election may devolve upon the 
House of Representatives. Then, indeed, intrigue and cabal may have their full scope; 
then may the existence of the Union bo put in extreme hazard. — Tncker's Blackstone, Appcn- 
aix, pp. 326-7. 

The authorities I have quoted show that, greal as was the satisfaction of the people 
with the mode of choosing a President, there was still an apprehension that trouble 
would arise from Congress by the only avenue left open for its influence, namely, the 
contingency in wliich the House might elect. Every other door was shut and barred 
against the interference of Congress or any member of Congress. 



Now, Mr. Speaker, contrast with the plan I have sketched, the theory of this bill. I 
have studied iis provisions in the light of the Constitution; and I am compelled to de- 
clare that it assails and overthrows, to its very foundation, the con.stitutional plan. Con- 
gress, finding iiselt excluded irom every step in the process of electing a President 
until the very last, from the mere fact that its presence is deemed necessary at the open- 
ing of the certificates and counting of the votes, tak-es occasion of that presence to 
usurp authority over the whole process fro.-n beginning to end. Coming only as an 
invited guesi to witness a grand and imposing ceremony, this bill makes Congress the 
chief acior and umpire in the scene; and, under cover of the word '"count," proposes 
to take command of every step in the process of making a President. 

Recurring ag;iin to the illustration I have used, Congress having a simple part to 
play in reference to the Utile block that crowns the pyramid, proposes to reach dowa 
through ail the others and supervise the whole from apex to base; or, rather, it pro- 
poses to overturn the whole pyramid nnd stand it upon its apex, so that it shall rest, 
not upon the broad base of the people's will, but upon the uncertain and despotic will 
of Congr.-ss. 

This is usurpation in every meaning of ihe word. Thoueh the Conslilufion has sought 
to kee|> Congress away from all the process of making a President, this bill creates and 
j)laces in the control of Congre^s the enginery by which presidents can be made and 
unmade at the caprice of the Senate and House. It grasps all the power, and holds 



9 

States and electors as toys in its hands. It assumes the right of Congress to go down 
into the colleges and inquire into all the acts and facts connected with their work. It 
assumes the right of Congress to go down into the States, to review the act of every 
officer, to open every ballot box, and to pass judgment upon every ballot castljy seven 
millions of Americans. 

I know the bill is not proposed as a permanent law ; but I know equally well that if 
the Congress of our centennial year shall pass this bill, they will destroy forever the 
constitutional plan of electing a President. Pass this bill, and the old constitutional 
safeguards are gone. Congress becomes a grand returning board from this day for- 
ward ; and we shall see no more Presidents elected by the States until the people 
rebuke the apostacy and. rebuild their old temple. 

Gentlemen on the other side of the House have expi-essed their indignation that one 
or two States in the Union have established returning-boards to examine and purge 
the returns from the ballot-boxes of their States ; and I must say for myself that I 
would not tolerate such a board unless intimidation, outrage, and murder made it 
necessary to preserve the rights of voters. All the evils that have been charged against 
all the returning-boards of the Southern States, this bill invites and welcomes to the 
Capitol of the nation. It makes Congress a vast, irresponsible, returning-board, with 
all the vices of and none of the excuses for the returning boards of the States. 

Now, if this general arrangement of the bill be not justly and fairly made, I should 
be glad to hear the distinguished gentlemen who approve it, show in what respect I 
have misrepresented or exaggerated its provisions. 

The early praciice, from the first count by John Langdon, by special directirn of the 
constitutional convention, was in accordance with the view I have taken. These prece- 
dents have been too often quoted, to need repetition. 

Mr. Speaker, our people have lived under the Constitution for eighty-seven years ; 
and in all that time, until our Government was nearly wrecked by rebellion, the Con- 
gress has never ventured to touch, with the smallest of its fingers, the action of any 
recognized State of the Union in creating the electoral colleges, nor the action of the 
colleges themselves in electing a President. 

Why, sir, in 1857, the electoral college in one of our States did not cast its vote on 
the day fixed by law : but the democratic President of the Senate counted the vote of 
Wisconsin and declared the result, in spite of all the clamor that was raised against 
him by both Houses; and that vote stands on record as a part of the official count. 

For more than three quarters of a century, there has been but one ground on which 
Congress has ever challenged and excluded an electoral vote ; and that ground was 
that some political organization calling itself a State, was not a State in law and in fact. 
When Missouri tried to vote before it was admitted into the Union, and when Indiana 
and Michigan tried to vote under, like circumstance?, their right to an electoral vote 
Avus challenged. That challenge might be defended on the ground that Congress alone 
can admit new States into the Union ; and no political society except the original thir- 
teen States is entitled to an electoral vote, without previous recognition by Congress. 

In 1865, while the fires of our great war were sfill blazing, when the vast warpowt^rs 
of the Constitution had b; en awakened from their sleep of half a century, and when 
eleven States had broken away from their normal relations to the Union, the Congress, 
without reflection, and, as they have since discovered, without the warrant of the 
Constitution, adopted the twenty-second joint rule for the sole purpose of keeping 
States from voting that were not yet restored to their places in the Union. This rule 
was bnsed on the same principle on which Congress had challenged the right of Mis- 
souri, Indiana, and Michigan to vote ; but unfortunately it did not in terms restrict 
objection to that ground Jilone. From that joint rule has sprung most of our pres-ent 
entanglement ; and the Republican party is responsible. It was one of the many mis- 
takes of that party during those years, when, too powerful for its own good or the 
good of the country, and flushed with victory, it went recklessly forward into acts 
that were unwarranted by sound policy, and of doubtful constitutionality. 

But for the adoption of the twenty-second joint rule in the midst of war, and its 
continuation after the war had ended, the hasty judgments of Senators and Represent- 
atives wduld not now complicate and embarass this Congress in solving the present 
problem. 

But it should not be forgotten that before this question arose, a Republican Senate 
confessed the wrong and abolished the rule. At the last session of Congress every 
Senator, without distinction of party, voted to declare it unwarranted by the Constitu- 



10 

tion. Even at this session, and in spite of the passion and heat of this presidential 
contest, all but foar of the Senators who were present, voted that the rule was no 
iono^er valid or binding. Every precedent which Congress made daring the last fifteen 
yea;^ under that rule, has come back to plague and disturb those who are seeking to 
find the wav out of our present difficulties by following the Constitution and laws. 
Without reflection, men of both parties have comoiitted themselves to the theory of 
the twenty- second joint rule; and their committals embarrass their action to-day. It is 
best for men and parties frankly to confess their errors and correct them. 

Bat to return to the pending bill. Besides the general arraignment I have made, I 
find in this first section of the bill that it invites objections to counting the votes of the 
States. It commands the presiding officer that whenever a State is called, he shall call 
for objections; and as many objections as any two members of Congress, one from each 
House, may please to make, shall be filed, no matter what ihe ground of objection 
may be ; and immediately the two Houses shall separate to consider all such objec- 
tions, if both Houses agree so to do, the vote of any State shall be rejected. 

The first section deliberately provides that though a State has appointed electors in 
perfect accordance with the law, and through its electoral college may have fulfilled 
all points of the law : though the certificates may be regular and perfect in every par- 
ticular, yet o:i the objection of two members of Congress, the two Houses may 
throw it out, may stifle the voice of that State, may nullify the constitutional election 
of a President. A legislative body is not obliged to give reasons for what it may law- 
fully do. It can act for bad reasons if it choose. I know the presumption of law is 
thjit all functionaries will do their duty ; but when we are conferring powers,, we should. 
ask what it is that we permit to be done. And the plain declaration of this first sec- 
tion is that Congress may at its discretion, for any reason good or bad, or for no reason, 
stifle the vote of any State. The Constitution commands that the votes shall he counted ; 
this bill declares that the votes may be rejected. It is a monstrous assumption, a reck- 
less usurpation of power. Congress may not use the vast powers herein granted ; but 
a vote for this bill is a vote that Congress may thus act. 

In opposition to this grant, I hold that neither House acting separately, nor both 
Houses acting concurrently, has any more authority to refuse to hear the voice of a 
State when it speaks through the lav/ in electing a President, than Great Britain has to 
say that the State shall not vote. Yet this first section invites contests, and assumes 
the right of Congress, at will, to reject the vote of any State. If this section becomes 
a law, every close State will hereafter grow a luxurious croup of contests, and unload 
their noxious harvests in the National Capitol. Not as in the past, one in the century, 
bat squadrons of Cronins will invade the electoral college at each future election. 

From what part of the Constitution is this measureless assumption of power drawn ? 
I have carefully read the debates in both Houses to find the source of this alleged 
authority: and I find but two clauses on which the allegation is baspd. The first is the 
simple fact of the presence of the two Houses at the opening and counting of the votes. 
How much power can be evoked from the world *' presence ?" We have seen that in 
all the previous steps in the process of electing a President, the little that Congress 
was permitted to do by the Constitution was merely to fix a date ; and finally, in the 
concluding act, the agency of Congress is narrowed down to a mere shadow, to a pres- 
ence. That is all. But a great deal of ingenuity and eloquence have been expended 
to add powjr to thit "• pre-iMC3 " We are told it woild be trifling with the dignity 
of Congress to call the two Houses as mere spectators of a dumb show. It may throw 
some light upon this word "presence" if we inquire what the diS'erent States of tlie 
Union have done in the matter of opening and declaring the votes of their people for 
State officers. I have taken the pains 'o examine the constitutions of thiny-seven 
States of the Union, all except that of Colorado which I have not seen : and I find this : 
In thirty of the thirty-seven States, the act of opening the votes and counting and de- 
claring them is definitely and absolutely described in their constitutions as an execu- 
tive act. In thirty States of the Union, the duty is devolved upon executive ofiicers. 
There are seven States, most of them the older States, in which the Legislature itself, 
acting jointly, or by means of joint committees, is the canvassing and returning board 
to examine the votes and declare the result. 

Mr. HOAR. Does not my honorable friend know that in every American State in 
existence when the Constitution was adopted, the vote for Governor was counted by 
the two branches ef the Legislature? 

Mr. GARFIELD. I will answer my friend with a great deal of pleasure ij.saiying.:- 



11 

that in a majority of all the oricrinal thirteen States, in 1787, the Legislatures elected 
the Governors. The people did not elect their supreme executive officer: and. as a 
matter of course, when the Governor was elected b}' the Legislature, the Legislature 
mariaged the whole process from beginning to end. It is true that in the gentle- 
man's own State, and in Connecticut, and in New Hampshire, the popular votes for 
Governor were, and in some States are still, returned, canvassed, counted and declared 
by the Legislatures themselves. 

Mr. HOAR. My friend does not answer the questi.^n to its fall extent. Does he 
not know that, in every one of the old thirteen States, the vote for Governor was 
counted by the Legislature, it being true that in some of them the Legislature cast the 
vote as well as counted it ? 

■ Mr. LAWRENCE. Let me say that it is not true of New York. On the contrary, 
the votes there were canvassed by officers designated, and the Legislature had no power 
over the subject. 

Mr. GxARFlELD. Allow me to read the provision of the constitution of my own 
State, made in 1802 under the immediate inspiration of the constitutional era, and the 
same language still stands in the constitution of Ohio with only a slight verbal change. 

Here is the provision : 

The president of the S^^nate shall open and publisli them, [tlie returns] in the presence 
of a majority of the memt?ers of each house of the General Assemhly. 

Substantially the same language is used in the present constitutions of twenty- one 
States of the Union. In these States, it is the unbroken practice that the presiding 
officer of the senate or house does open and does publish and does declare the result ; 
and only where a contest arises, regulated by law, is the result as declared by him, 
questioned at all. Though their constitutions require the presence of a majority of 
both houses, they have no function except that of witnesses. If the dignity of twenty- 
one Legislatures is not affronted by this provision, the dignity of our two Houses ought 
not to suffer by granting its presence one day in four years. 

An incident occurred in the State of Ohio, nearly thirty years ago, which is worthy o^ 
mention. The election for governor was close and doubtful. In obedience to the con- 
stitution, both houses of the Legislature assembled, and the president of the senate pro- 
ceeded to open and publish the returns. As the tellers were making the lists and foot- 
ing up the votes an objection was made to counting the vote from one of the counties, 
and the business 'was delayed by tumult, when the president of the senate, taking the 
certificate from the hands of the tellers, completed the count and declared the result,: 
in obedience to the constitution. He did not permit the performance of an executive 
duty to be prevented or hindered by the presence of legislative witnesses. 

The claim is set up that the presence of the two Houses implies that they are to do 
something ; that tney are to count the votes. Formulate that construction in definite 
words and it Avill read : " In the presence of the two Houses the votes shall be counted 
by the two Houses." That is, they shall count the \otes in iheir oioii presence. Let 
us not charge the framers of the Constitution with such stupid tautology. 

We have seen that in the third step two things were to be done, two acts to be per- 
formed ; not acts of legislation, not laws to be devised, but acts to be done, executive 
acts. And the only executive officer present is the President of the Senate. One of 
these two acts he is expressly commanded to perform ; he " shall open all the certifi- 
cates." That is past question. 

In reference to the other, the Constitution says it shall be done. We are asked why 
the language changes from the active to the passive voice. I have already suggested 
the reason: that when the roll of the States is called, each answers through the certifi- 
cates which announce their votes for President and Vice-President. The States speak 
through the electoral colleges when the certificates are read ; and nothing is left but the 
imperial command: the votes "shall be counted." Arithmetic does the work. It 
may be in the person of the President of the Senate, a teller, or a clerk. 

" What can be plainer than that our fathers intemled that a certain, summary, and un- 
questioned result should be had? They determined to create a President; and 
adopted a plan, which, if not overthrown, would certainly accomplish the result. 
I am not controverting the position taken by my friend from M;issachusetts. [Mr. 
Hoar,] and I think justly, that under the general clause in another section of the Con- 
st4tution,_ Congress, may regulate the m-ethod of doing any thi ngl that this Constitution 



12 

orders to be done. I admit most fully that Congress may regulate the act of opening 

the certiiicates, and may regulate the work of counting ; but it cannot push its power 
to regulate beyond the meaning of the words that describe the thing to be done. It 
cannot ingraft a judiciary system upon tlie word "open." It cannot evolve a court- 
man ial from the word " count." It cannot erect a star-chamber upon either or both 
of these words. It cannot plant the seeds of despotism between the lines or words of 
the Constitution. 

I have no doubt that Congress, under the general clause referred to, may regulate 
how the opening of the certifiaates shall be done, whether in alphabetical or chronolog- 
ical order; and may make any regulation necessary and appropriate. I have no doubt 
that Congress may provide by law who shall count or add up the votes : how the lists 
of votes shall be recorded— whether on paper or parchment. I do not hold that the 
Constitution has made it the exclusive duty of the President of the Senate to count the 
votes. That is no part of my argument. It makes no difference who counts, only so 
that the counting is done. I am seeking to find what authority Congress may exercise 
in reference to the election of the President. I admit that Congress may legislate upon 
the subject wherever the Constitution has made legislation possible. Bat I insist that 
Congress can go no farther. In reference to the last act of the process, Congress can- 
not go beyond the just scope and meaning of the word " count." If gentlemen want 
to " stick in the bark " in their construction of this clause, let me follow their example 
for a moment. If you tell me that the power of the President of the Senate ends with 
the word " open," then I tell you that the presence of the two Houses is dispensed 
with at the same instant. He shall, in the presence of the two Houses, open all the 
cer'.iccates. Stop there. If at thai point " the Constitution turns its back upon the 
President of the Senate," it also, at the same moment, turns its back upon the two 
Houses. The " presence " and the President disappear together. 

But I do not propose thus to read the Constitution with a microscope. I admit the 
difficulty of the situation. I recognize honest differences of opinion in regard to the 
true construction of the clause. But after reading them all, I return to that clear and 
comprphensive exposition of ths venerable Chancellor Kent, which was full of wisdom 
and prophecy. It was his opinion, that in the absence of legislation on the subject, it 
would be the duty of the President of the Senate to count the votes and declare the 
result. 

I do not object to an act of Congress to regulate all that can be regulated. I have 
never objected to such legislation. In 18G8, on my motion, a resolution was passed by 
this House directing our Judiciary Committee to inquire into this question of such vital 
and ti-anscendent importance, and report what legislation was possible. But no action 
was taken ; and in the absence of legislation, we are remanded to the Constitution itself. 
If we obey it, we shall find a plain way out of our troubles. 

Again I return tp the bill before us, and call attention to the second section, to the 
case where there are two returns. And here again is an invitation to anybody to get up 
a contest by sending "papers purporting to be certificates of electoral votes." It does 
not limit the contest to double returns from the officers of a State f but two or more re- 
turns from anybody residing within the territory of a State, may be considered under the 
provisions of this section. If anybody within a State manufactures a return, calls it a 
certificate of votes of electors, and forwards it to the President of the Senate, he must 
receive it and treat it as a return, and submit it to the tribunal provided by this section. 

[Here the hammer fell.] 

The SPEAKER pro tempore, (Mr. Hooker.) The time of the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Garfield] has expired. 

Mr. HUBBELL. I move that the time of the gentleman be extended. 

Mr. GARFIELD. Am I not speaking in my own right and entitled to one hour? 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Tha gentleman was speaking in fifty minutes of the 
time of the gentleman from Maine, [Mr. Hale.] 

Mr. GARFIELD. I supposed I was speaking in my own right ; but if the Speaker 
rules otherwise I submit to his decision. 

Mr. HOAR. I suppose that no other gentleman will desire to sjjeak to-night, and I 
ask consent that the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Garfield] have leave to proceed with 
his remarks. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. If there be no objection, the gentleman will be al- 
lowed to proceed. 



13 

There was no objection. 

Mv. GARFIELD. I thank my friend from Massachusetts, [Mr. Hoar,] and also 
the House, for this courtesy. 

Now, in the case of a double return, a course is to be taken wholly unlike that which 
is laid down in the first section, where the vote of the State is left at the mercy of the 
two Houses. But double returns from a State are to be sent to a mixed commission, 
consisting of an equal number of members from each House of Congress and. the 
Supreme Court. That commission is virtually clothed with power to hear and deter- 
mine the vote of any such State, and its decision is the law, final and conclusive, unless 
both Houses shall concur in reversing the decree. 

The commission is authorized to do whatever the two Houses may do in reference 
to deciding the presidential election. That is. Congress delegates its power to 
fifteen persons. If it be a delegation of legislative power, it is clearly in conflict with 
the Constitution; for all authorities concur in the doctrine that legislative power cannot 
be delegated. If the power conferred on the commission be executive or judicial power, 
then the members of the commission are officers of the United States, and their ap- 
pointment is a legislative appointment. But the Constitution has placed the appoint- 
Eg of all officers in the hands of the President and the heads of Departments. 

When, in 1871, an associate justice of the Supreme Court, the late Judge Nelson, 
was appointed oa the joint high commission to negotiate the treaty of Washington, his 
name was sent to the Senate and confirmed on the 10th day of February, as were the 
nominations of the Secretary of State and the Attorney-General to the same commis- 
sion. It was found necessary in order to comply with the Constitution that those 
commissioners should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. If 
the commissioners here proposed are officers, how can you take five Senators and five 
members of the House and make them officers, when the Constitution forbids that a 
member of either House shall hold any office under the United States ? Notice these 
difficulties that beset you at every step as you walk through the mazes of this bill. 

But a far more important question is that of the powers conferred upon this com- 
mission. Here is certainly a new thing under the sun. This commission of fifteen 
persons is empowered to roam at will throughout the realms of the constitution and 
laws, and to assume whatever jurisdiction they think they are entitled to assume in 
reference to the subject. No jurisdictional limits are prescribed; but the commission is 
endowed " with the same powers now possessed by the two Houses acting separately or 
together." The two Houses of Congress say in effect to the commission: "We trans- 
fer our powers to you. Construe them for yourselves. Use or refuse them, as you 
please. If you choose to confine yourselves to the papers that have been delivered to 
the President of the Senate, halt there. If you conclude to enter the electoral colleges 
and overhaul them, enter. If you choose to content yourselves with such an examina- 
tion, stop there; but if you wish to go deeper and embrace within the sweep of your 
examination all the States and all the officers of the States, all the ballot-boxes and all 
the ballots in them, do so. Take the Sherman report, take the Morrison report, take 
the Howe report, take the Palmer report, take the Florida report and the South Caro- 
lina report, and the Cronin report. Accumulate cart-loads of reports and documents 
upon your tables, and sit down at your leisure to digest and make the most of them." 

Such, Mr. Speaker, is the scope- of possible power given to this commission. But 
that is not enough. They may "take into view such petitions, depositions, and other 
papers, if any, as shall by the Constitution be competent and petinent in such con- 
sideration." They may also sent for persons and papers, because they have all the 
powers possesed by the two Houses or either of them ; and this House certainly has 
shown its power to send for persons and papers beyond any of its predecessors. 
[Laughter.] 

Now, I would treat this bill with all respect, for I do most sincerely respect the men 
who made it. But when the members of this commission come to verify and explore 
their powers, they will find one limitation so thoroughly Pickwickian, that I am sure 
they will enjoy it as literature, if not as law. That limitation is in the brief and crisp 
language of the bill "tf any." The commission may do all these things enumerated; 
may exercise all the vast powers residing in the Constitution, or conferred upon either 
House of Congress, or both, " if any.'''' 

In reading this clause, I was reminded of a speech delivered in the Hall about ten 
years ago, by a gentleman who was imploring us to receive our southern brethren who 
came knocking at the doors of Congress, and not keep them out any longer. A dis- 
tinguished gentleman from Illinois rose and said : 



14 

I desire to ask the genf leman from New Jersey what he would do if our southern brethren, 
as he calls them, should come to our doors with certificates of election to Congress and ask to 
be admitted while their hands are still red with the blood of our brethren of the North ? 

Pausing solemnly for a moment, the orator replied : 

If our southern friends come to the door of this House and ask to be admitted, I, sir, for 
one, am in favor of receiving them in the very spirit in w^hich they come to us, provided they 
come in that spirit. 
[Laughter.] 

So the commission may do all and singular, and exercise all powers that are given, 
*' if any ;" but of the " if any " they must judge. 

Now, Mr. Speaker, I call the attention of my distinguished friend from Massachu- 
setts [Mr. Hoar] to what may happen if this bill should become a law. From a care- 
ful reading of its provisions, it appears entirely possible for the two Houses and the 
commission to prevent the declaration of any result whatever. Remembering that 
there are thirty-eight States, and that in each case, the President of the Senate must 
call for objections, and that upon each objection the two Houses must separate, and 
that the debate may proceed for two hours upon each objection, and that the House 
may take a recess for one day on each of these objections, a failure to reach a result is 
altogether possible. Suppose the case of Florida is reached, and one party finds itself 
disappointed in the judgment of the tribunal, and is so determined not to be pleased 
with the result that it prefers to prevent a completion of the count ; how can such an 
attempt be prevented under the provisions of this bill? 

There are but twenty-eight secular days from the day when the count begins, before 
this Congress will expire by limitation. I want to ask my friend from Massachusetts 
whether he thinks there is no danger in that direction ; whether he does not also see 
that this bill may make it impoesible for the President of the Senate to obey the plain 
mandate of the Constitution that he " shall open all the certificates and the votes shall 
then be counted? " There m.ay be no then left, in which to open the certificates near the 
foot of the list. 

Mr. HOAR. As my distinguished friend from Ohio has invited my attention to his 
argument, he will allow me to ask him whether the case he puts is not precisely such a 
one as may happen under any government under the sun ; whether in any government 
the constituent parts may not refuse to do their duty. And what would happen under 
his theory if the President of the Senate did not choose to count the votes ? Does the 
gentleman suppose the two Houses of Congress are any more likely than any one man 
to perform their constitutional duty and thus permit the Government to go to pieces? 

Mr. GARFIELD. My friend strengthens my argument. If the President of the 
Senate should refuse to open the certificates, the Senate can depose him in an hour, and 
put another President in his place who will obey the Constitution. 

Mr. HOAR. Suppose the Senate should refuse to do it? 

Mr. GARFIELD. Then you have a legislative body which you cannot control ; and 
this illustrates the radical evil of this bill. It admits to a share in counting the votes, 
two uncontrollable legislative bodies ; but when that duty is in the hands of one per- 
son he is liable to punishment for neglect or malfeasance in office. And precisely for 
that reason, my theory of the Constitution is safer and more practicable than that of my 
friend. 

Mr. HOAR. Then the body that you cannot control is the only thing you have got 
to control him. 

Mr. GARFIELD. Impeachment, expulsion, personal disgrace, all bear with tra- 
mendous force upon the individual officer. He is more amenable to public opinion ■ 
and to the law that can seize him, and acts with a keener sense of personal responsi- 
bility than a legislative body, where responsibility is divided. The bad behavior of the 
two Houses is my friend's problem, not mine. When the Houses go wrong them is -nO-- j 
remedy in a case like this. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes 1 

Mr. HOAR. That is a doctrine you cannot find in the American Constitution or the 
utterance of a single one of its framers. 

Mr. GARFIELD. I think my friend will acknowledge that all executive officers are 
subject to impeachment and removal and punishment ; but will he find anything in the 
doctrine of the fathers, in the Constitution or the laws, by which a legislative body can 
be punished for a dereliction of duty ? 



15 

The radical and incurable defect of this bill is that it puts a vast, cumbrous machine 
in the place of the simple, plain, plan of the Constitution ; it adopts a method which 
invites and augments the evils from which we now suffer. It assumes that seven mem- 
bers of the commisston will cancel another seven ; and that the decision will finally 
turn upon the action of the fifteeLth unknown member. In what respect is this better 
than to leave the President of the Senate to decide which is the true certificate, subject 
to be overruled by the concurrent vote of the two Houses? In one case, the decision 
may be made in secret, by a person who is yet unknown. In the other, it is made. in 
the presence of both Houses of Congress, by the second highest executive officer of the 
nation. That there are difficulties in the present situation, I freely admit ; that there 
may be doubt, honest doubt, in the minds of honest men as to who is elected President, 
I admit. But I think the bill introduced by my colleague from Ohio, [Mr. Fosteu,] 
which provides for submitting to the Supreme Court those questions of constitutional 
law about which we differ, would be far better. To the adjudication of that great and 
honored tribunal, all would bow with ready obedience ; but this novel, dangerous, and 
cumbrous device is, in my judgment, unwarranted by the Constitution. If we adopt 
it, we shirk a present difficulty ; but in doing so, we create far greater ones for those 
■who come after us. What to us is a difficulty, will be to them a peril. 

Mr. Speaker, I have trespassed too long upon the indulgence of the House ; but I 
cannot withhold from the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Hoar] the tribute of my 
admiration for the earnestness and eloquence with which he closed his defense of this 
measure. I even shared his enthusiasm, when, looking forward to the future of this 
nation he pictured to our imagination the gratitude of those who may occupy these 
Halls a hundred years hence, for the wisdom which planned and virtue which adopted 
this act, which my friend believes to be the great act of the century ; an act that solves 
a great national difficulty, that calms party passion, that averts the dangers of civil 
war. Let us hope, Mr. Speaker, that they will not be compelled to add that, though 
this act enabled the men of 1877 to escape from temporary troubles, yet it entailed 
upon their children evils far more serious and perils far more formidable ; that it 
transmitted to them shattered institutions, and set the good ship of tne Union adrift 
upon an unknown and harborless sea. I hope they may not say that we built no safe- 
guard against dangers except the slight ones that threatened us. It would be a far 
higher tribute if they could say of us: " The men of 1876, who closed the cycle of 
the first century of the Republic, were men who, when they encountered danger, met 
it with clear-eyed wisdom and calm courage. As the men of 1876 met the perils of 
their time without flinching, and through years of sacrifice, suffering, and blood con- 
quered their independence and created a nation, so the men of 1776, after having de- 
fended the great inheritance from still greater perils, bravely faced and conquered all 
the difficulties of their own epoch and did not entail them upon their children. 

" That no threats of civil war, however formidable, could compel them to throw 
away any safeguard of liberty ; that the preservation of their institutions was to them 
an object of greater concern than present ease or temporary prosperity ; that, instead 
of framing new devices which might endanger the old Constitution, they rejected all 
doubtful expedients, and planting their feet upon the solid rock of the Constitution, 
stood at their posts of duty until the tempest was overpassed, and peace walked hand 
in hand with liberty, ruled by law." [Applause.] 

During the many calm years of the century, our pilots have grown careless of the 
course. The master of a vessel sailing down Lake Ontario has the whole breadth ot 
that beautiful inland sea for his pathway. But when his ship arrives at the chute of the 
La Chine, there is but one path of safety. With a steady hand, a clear eye, and a 
brave heart, he points his prow to the well-fixed landmarks on the shore, and with 
death on either hand, makes the plunge and shoots the rapids in safety. 

We too are approaching the narrows ; and we hear the roar of angry waters below, 
and the muttering of sullen thunder overhead. Unterrified by breakers or tempest, 
let us steer our course by the Constitution of our fathers, and we shall neither sink in 
the rapids, nor compel our children to " shoot Niagara and perish in the whirlpool. 
[Great applause.] 



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